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Lehmkuhl: Questions After Matal v. Tam

THE AFTERMATH OF MATAL V. TAM: UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS AND EARLY APPLICATIONS
Andrew M. Lehmkuhl II

I. INTRODUCTION
Seven applications to register a trademark for the N-word were filed
since June 19, 2017.1 Similar applications were filed for the swastika
symbol.2 Prior to that date, a provision of the federal statute governing
trademark registration (The Lanham Act) expressly made federal
registration unavailable for disparaging terms or symbols. 3 In the
landmark decision in Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court held that this ban
on disparaging trademarks violated the First Amendment as an
unconstitutional restriction on free speech.4
Many questions remain following the decision in Tam. Primarily,
clear guidance does not exist for whether similar trademark subject
prohibitions included in the Lanham Act also violate the First
Amendment as an unconstitutional abridgement of speech. Additionally,
significant questions arise as to the level of First Amendment
involvement in the statutory bans on federal registration of certain
trademarks. However, while careful consideration confirms indirect
First Amendment implication, these statutory prohibitions still would
not survive the rational basis review that would be afforded otherwise.
Regardless of the remaining questions involving trademark law and
the First Amendment, the decision in Tam will have broad resounding
effects in other areas of government registration. Early applications and
adherence of the analysis set forth in Tam show that District Courts and
Circuit Courts alike are applying the Tam holding in other cases
involving government registration programs that fall outside of the
umbrella of trademark law.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will first provide an overview of the history of trademark
law and the development of the Lanham Act, primarily Section 2(a)
which prohibited trademark registration for disparaging terms. Next, this
section will introduce Simon Tam and his band the Slants, and briefly
1. Andrew Chung, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Leads to Offensive Trademark Requests, Reuters
(June 23, 2017), https://goo.gl/Xv4Sr8; NIGGA, Registration No. 87496454.
2. Id; Swastika, Registration No. 87503998.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
4. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).

871

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 9

872

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

summarize Tam’s initial dispute over Section 2(a). Finally, this section
will summarize and provide relevant highlights from the Supreme
Court’s holding and analysis in Matal v. Tam.
A. Trademark Law and the Lanham Act
Trademarks consist of words, names, symbols, or devices that a
person uses to identify and distinguish his or her goods or services from
those manufactured, sold, or otherwise provided by others.5 In the
simplest sense, trademarks are designed to identify the source of goods
or services, and may be commonly understood as a brand.6 The use of
trademark has deep historical underpinnings, and modern trademark law
presents an interesting dynamic between state and federal law, as well as
statutory and common law.
Trademarks have been widely used for centuries, dating back as long
as the origins of commerce itself.7 Archaeologists excavating ancient
Egyptian sites have discovered building bricks imprinted with the names
of the manufacturers.8 Asian ceramics produced in approximately 2700
B.C. carried marks indicating the name of their maker or their place of
origin.9 Humans are naturally competitive, so temptation arose early for
a producer of goods to simply apply the trademark of a better known,
more successful producer on his or her own goods in order to increase
sales. To protect against this falsehood, many societies enacted laws
prohibiting the copying of established trademarks.10
Prior to the mid-20th century in the United States, trademark law was

5. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127; KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 115 (2004). The term “service mark” is specifically used to describe a trademark that identifies the
source of a service. However, the terms “trademark” and in short, “mark,” encompass trademarks,
service marks, brand names, trade dress, certification marks, and collective marks. Protecting Your
Trademark: Enhancing Your Rights Through Federal Registration, United States Patent and Trademark
Office, https://goo.gl/VPZNkW (last visited Feb. 7, 2018); William M. Borchard, A Trademark is Not a
Copyright or a Patent 1, 3 (2014).
6. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., 543 U.S. at 115.
7. Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks – Their Early History, 59 Trademark Reporter 551, 552
(1969); Samuel Birch, History of Ancient Pottery: Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, Etruscan, and Roman, 12,
17, 2nd ed. (1873).
8. Id.
9. Paster, supra note 7.
10. In France, holders of infringed trademarks were entitled to civil remedies as early as the
thirteenth century. Id. at 557. In other areas during the Middle Ages, trademark infringement was
criminalized; sometimes rising to the level of felony. Id.
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embedded almost entirely in common law.11 Under common law, an
individual earned the exclusive right to a trademark simply by using it. 12
This right was geographically-dependent, meaning it was applicable
only within the territory the mark was used so it would expand and
shrink according to the region served by the trademark holder’s
business.13 In addition to the common law, many states also enacted
statutes governing trademark registration and protection.14 Ultimately, in
1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act,15 creating a federal source of
trademark law and protection. In sum, trademarks may be recognized
and protectable via common law, state law, federal law, or some
combination of the three.
Through the Lanham Act, Congress constructed a national system of
trademark registration16 and created federal rights of action against
trademark infringement17 among many other provisions generally
governing trademark law. Federal registration under the Lanham Act is
not mandatory,18 but it affords several advantages to the trademark
holder. Federal trademark registration provides notice to the public
regarding the trademark holder’s official ownership of the mark.19
Additionally, while a trademark holder is still required to enforce their
own rights to using their mark, a legal presumption of valid mark
ownership is created in all states through federal registration.20
Notably, § 1052 of the Lanham Act applies a series of limitations to
the subject matter that is eligible for trademark registration and
protection under federal law. The initial limitation, known as the

11. Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Concepts of Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 5 TRADEMARK
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 7, 21 (2013). Congress enacted several
statutes in the 1870s to allow individuals to register their trademarks with the United States Patent
Office and receive federal trademark rights, as well as to provide causes of action against infringement
of registered trademarks. 16 Stat. 198; 19 Stat. 141. However, in 1879, the Supreme Court of the United
States held this statute unconstitutional in the famous “Trade-Mark Cases.” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 99 (1879).
12. Ginsburg, supra note 11; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
13. Ginsburg, supra note 11; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
14. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1329.54 et seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.560 et seq.; Ind. Code. Ann. §
5-28-39-1 et seq.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
16. However, note that registration is not a prerequisite to receive trademark protection. Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“. . . it is common ground that § 43(a)
protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for
registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an
unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).”).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 et seq.
18. Trademark Basics, United States Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://goo.gl/fBKQCo (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
19. Id.
20. Id.
AND

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 9

874

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

Disparagement Clause (“Section 2(a)”), prohibits trademarks that
“[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or
bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”21
To determine whether a trademark is disparaging, the examining
attorney for the patent and trademark office employs a two-part test.
First, the examiner assesses “the likely meaning of the matter in
question, taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the
relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of
the goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the
marketplace in connection with the goods or services.”22 Next, the
examiner determines “[i]f that meaning is found to refer to identifiable
persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning
may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced
group.”23
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act stood for nearly 70 years, and many
disparaging terms were denied federal trademark registration.24 At one
of arguably the most extremes in 1999, an individual was able to
establish standing to oppose O.J. Simpson’s trademark registrations of
O.J. SIMPSON, O.J., and THE JUICE solely by arguing that “as a
Christian, family man,” the marks were offensive to him because they
were synonymous with a “wife-beater and wife-murderer.”25 Several
years later, the state of Section 2(a) swung to the complete opposite
extreme in the cornerstone case for this article: Matal v. Tam.26
B. In re Tam
Enter Simon Tam, an Asian-American musician and activist from San
Diego, California. Tam witnessed “the power of language” at an early

21. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
22. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1203.03(b)(i), https://goo.gl/Zzfz8E (last
visited Feb. 14, 2018).
23. Id.
24. Id. In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Geller v. PTO, 135 S. Ct. 944 (2015), cert.
denied (affirmed the registration refusal of the mark STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA
under Section 2(a)).
25. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff’s
opposition to Simpson’s marks have a “reasonable basis in fact” and remanded for further proceedings).
Simpson eventually abandoned his trademark registration applications. Christina Mitropoulos, American
Trademark Story: Ritchie v. Simpson, The George Washington University Law School Intellectual
Property and Entertainment Law Brief (2016), https://goo.gl/qsqbsh.
26. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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age.27 In an opinion piece published in The New York Times, Tam
described experiencing race-based torment by other children, being
called racial and ethnic slurs such as “gook” and “Jap.”28 At only eleven
years of age, the young Tam defiantly “threw back, ‘I’m a chink, get it
right.’”29 Through this act of defiance, Tam aimed to expressly claim his
own identity and to spin the negative words being used by others into a
positive part of his identity.30
In 2006, Tam founded an all Asian-American dance rock band in
Portland, Oregon.31 When the time arrived to choose a name for the
band, Tam solicited ideas from friends by asking about common
stereotypes of Asian-Americans.32 Tam’s friends commonly responded
that individuals of Asian descent stereotypically have “slanted eyes.” 33
Thus, he named the band The Slants “in order to ‘reclaim’ the term and
drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons.”34
Tam and The Slants popularity grew. They began to tour “the
country, promoting social justice, playing anime conventions, raising
money for charities and fighting stereotypes about Asian-Americans by
playing bold music.”35 Then in 2010, Tam learned that some fans had
accidentally purchased tickets for another band also with the name The
Slants.36 So to avoid the continuance of this problem, Tam sought
trademark registration for the name in 2011.37 Accordingly, Tam filed
an application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).38
In 2012, the PTO issued a refusal to Tam’s trademark registration
application on the basis of the Disparagement Clause found in Section
2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding that the mark “consists of or includes
matter which may disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute persons,
institutions, beliefs or national symbols.”39 Specifically, the examining
attorney of the PTO refused the application on the grounds that “THE
27. Simon Tam, The Slants on the Power of Repurposing a Slur, The New York Times (June 23,
2017), https://goo.gl/JYVRXA.
28. Id.; “Gook” and “Jap” are derogatory terms aimed at individuals of Korean and Japanese
descent or ethnicity.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Kat Chow, What's Next for The Founder of The Slants, And the Fight Over Racial Slurs,
NPR (July 6, 2017 at 6:00 AM ET), https://goo.gl/a5rgEU (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
33. Id.
34. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017).
35. Tam, supra note 27.
36. Chow, supra note 32.
37. THE SLANTS, FEDTM 85472044.
38. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 *1 (TTAB 2013).
39. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
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SLANTS is a highly disparaging reference to people of Asian descent,
that it retains this meaning when used in connection with the applicant’s
services, and that a substantial composite of the referenced group finds it
to be disparaging.”40 Applying the requisite two-part test under Section
2(a), the PTO examiner argued that use of The Slants was meant to be
derogatory.41 Further, the examiner found that a substantial composite of
people find the term offensive.42
Tam appealed directly to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB), the administrative board of the PTO to which initial appeals of
trademark registration decisions are made.43 Tam argued that the
examiners “improperly condition registration on the ethnic background
of an applicant,” and that specifically, “based on the examining
attorney’s logic, non-Asians would be entitled to registration of the
word ‘slants’ but Asians are not.”44 Despite Tam’s clear expression of
his goal to reclaim the stereotype and weaken the derogatory force of the
slur The Slants, the TTAB affirmed the refusal of Tam’s registration
application.45 Notably, the TTAB emphasized that the USPTO’s refusal
to register Tam’s mark in no way affected Tam’s right to use The Slants
as his band name.46 Specifically, the TTAB characterized such refusal as
unrelated to Tam’s First Amendment rights to free speech and
expression because “[n]o conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of
expression is suppressed,” but rather the restriction only implicates the
availability of federal government resources in assisting with enforcing
the applicant’s mark.47
Tam then filed another appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, whose jurisdiction applied under § 1295.48 While
maintaining his previous arguments, Tam also challenged the
constitutionality of Section 2(a) on the grounds that the restriction on
disparaging trademarks violate the First Amendment, directly attacking
the TTAB’s point of distinction in earlier proceedings.49
In April 2015, the three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit expanded
upon the TTAB’s point of distinction to some extent, holding that
refusal of the registration as disparaging was within the discretion of the
40. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 at *2-*3.
41. Id. at *16.
42. Id. at *23-*24.
43. About the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
https://goo.gl/mBu9Ya (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
44. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 at *9-*10.
45. Id. at *25.
46. Id. at *24.
47. Id.
48. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
49. Id. at 571.
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PTO, and that such refusal under Section 2(a) does not violate the
Constitution because: (1) denial of the registration does not prohibit use
of the mark;50 (2) Section 2(a)’s ban of disparaging trademarks was
sufficiently precise so as not to be void for vagueness; 51 (3) the process
of applying for registration met standards of due process;52 and (4) equal
protection was not violated because the registration refusal was based on
disparagement rather than race.53
However, a sua sponte request for the case to be reheard en banc was
granted, and so the initial Federal Circuit opinion was vacated, and
Tam’s appeal was resurrected.54 Judge Kimberly Moore delivered the
majority opinion for the twelve-judge panel, which then vacated the
TTAB’s holding, finding that Section 2(a) is an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment and remanding for further
proceedings.55 Notably, the Federal Circuit limited the parties briefs to
solely the issue of First Amendment implication in Section 2(a)’s bar on
registration of disparaging trademarks, highlighting that the TTAB’s
outright rejection of a First Amendment implication, at the very least,
did not employ as thorough of an analysis as necessary. 56
C. Matal v. Tam
Less than five months after the en banc Federal Circuit’s opinion, the
PTO petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to review the
Federal Circuit’s invalidation of Section 2(a) as unconstitutional. 57 By
Fall 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.58 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s finding that
Section 2(a) is an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment, but
significant questions remain.59
First, the Court held that Section 2(a) applies to trademarks that
disparage members of a race or ethnicity. 60 Section 2(a) provided that
federal trademark registration was unavailable to marks that “disparage
or falsely suggest a connection with persons.“61 Tam argued that the
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 572 (citing In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (Cust. & Pat. App 1981)).
Id.
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 573.
In re Shiao Tam, 600 Fed. Appx. 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1334. The Federal Circuit also received ten amicus briefs on the same issue.
Lee v. Shiao Tam, 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1726 (2016).
Lee v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 30 (2016).
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
Id. at 1756.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
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definition of the term “persons,” as used in Section 2(a), extended only
to “natural and juristic persons” and did not include “non-juristic entities
such as racial and ethnic groups.”62 Tam pointed to the definition of
“person” included in the Lanham Act, which provided that “[i]n the
construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from
the context . . . [t]he term ‘person’ and any other word or term used to
designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or
rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic
person as well as a natural person.”63 The Court found that a plain
meaning of the text refuted Tam’s argument because Section 2(a)
prohibited marks that disparage “persons” and the disparagement of a
racial group certainly disparages persons included in that racial group. 64
Tam also turned to the history of the enforcement of Section 2(a) to
support his narrow construction of the term “persons” in Section 2(a).65
He contended that for many years, the PTO allowed registration of
“marks that plainly denigrated African-Americans and Native
Americans.”66 However, the Supreme Court found this point
unpersuasive, stating that the PTO’s early practice of Section 2(a) was
“unenlightening” because the vagueness of the provision has “produced
a haphazard record of enforcement.”67
The majority then addressed whether Section 2(a) violated the First
Amendment, specifically addressing three arguments by the government
to overcome First Amendment violation.68 The government argued that
trademark registration is government speech or commercial speech, not
pure private speech, and therefore, First Amendment restraints do not
apply.69 Additionally, the government argued that federal trademark
registration was a government subsidy, and if not, then Section 2(a)
should be analyzed under a new “government-program” doctrine.70
The Court rejected the argument that federal trademark registration
constitutes government speech, finding that the actual marks being
registered by the PTO, a government agency, were not created by the
government, did not convey a government message, and the public did

62. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1755.
63. Id. at 1755; 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127.
64. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1756.
65. Id.
66. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756 (2017).
67. Id. at 1756-57.
68. Id. at 1757.
69. Id.; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Ass’n., 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005); Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
70. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757.
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not associate the mark with the government.71 Because federal
trademark registration did not constitute government speech, First
Amendment protections apply.
The government also argued that trademark registration is
commercial speech.72 The basis of trademark rights exist in their use in
commerce and the purpose of trademarks are to distinguish between
sources of goods and services. Even if federal trademark registration
was commercial speech, the Court found that Section 2(a) would fail the
appropriate First Amendment analysis.73 To assess whether the First
Amendment has been violated in the context of commercial speech, the
restriction on speech must be narrowly drawn to serve a substantial
interest.74 The Court held that at best, the government’s most substantial
interest involved insulating the “orderly flow of commerce from
disruption caused by trademarks that support invidious
discrimination.”75 But most likely, the purpose of Section 2(a) was to
prevent offensive speech, which “strikes at the heart of the First
Amendment.”76 Further, the Court held that prohibiting any trademark
that disparages any person or group could not be narrowly drawn, and
therefore violates the First Amendment.
The government argued that Section 2(a) constitutes a government
subsidy, and therefore First Amendment protections do not apply. 77
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has held that the “government is not
required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to promote.”78
Under this argument, if federal trademark registration were to be
considered a government subsidy, the government would be afforded
deference free from First Amendment protections in choosing which
trademarks to register and which to deny. However, the Supreme Court
also rejected this argument, finding a clear distinction from cases
involving government subsidy questions, all of which involved direct
monetary subsidies.79 In federal trademark registration, the PTO does
not provide payment to applicants seeking registration, but rather

71. Id. at 1760.
72. Id. at 1764.
73. Id.
74. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Cent. Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
75. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1749.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1760.
78. Id. (citing Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013)).
79. Id.; Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 118 S.
Ct. 2168 (1998); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
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collects money from applicants in exchange for review.80
Finally, the government proposed a novel “government-program
doctrine” for First Amendment analysis. 81 This proposed doctrine would
merge the analyses and precedent from government speech First
Amendment case law and government subsidy case law.82 This would
ultimately afford the government more deference in refusing registration
based on content or based on speaker.83 The Court expressly rejected
such a doctrine on the grounds that this would allow for vast viewpoint
discrimination, and viewpoint discrimination is expressly forbidden.84
With all three of the government’s arguments failing, the Court
ultimately held that Section 2(a) was an unconstitutional abridgement of
an applicant’s First Amendment right to free speech and expression by
limiting the scope of marks available for federal trademark registration
on the grounds of disparagement.85
III. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND EARLY
APPLICATIONS OF MATAL V. TAM
While the Supreme Court’s ruling in Matal v. Tam may seem direct
on its face, many questions remain as to the effect of the overturning of
Section 2(a). This section will discuss major points of uncertainty and
potential implications that arise therefrom. First, using the case of In re
Brunetti as context, this section will address whether the analysis in Tam
regarding Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause should apply similarly to
its “immoral or scandalous” provision. Next, this section will argue that
Section 2(a) may not be as clear of a First Amendment issue as the Tam
Court conveyed, and at most, Section 2(a) is an indirect restriction of an
applicant’s First Amendment right to free speech and expression.
Finally, this section will discuss an early application of the Tam holding
and analysis out of the Second Circuit in Wandering Dago v. Destito,86
and explain why the First Amendment implications were much more
concrete in that case than in Tam despite the clear similarities.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1761.
Id.
Id. at 1761-62.
Id. at 1763.
Id.
See id.
Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 28 (2nd Cir. 2018).
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A. Unanswered questions
1. Section 2(a)’s “immoral and scandalous” provision should be
interpreted similarly to the disparagement clause.
The majority in Matal v. Tam clearly determined that Section 2(a)’s
prohibition of disparaging trademarks constitutes unconstitutional
viewpoint-based discrimination by the government. However, the Court
narrowly applied this analysis to only the provision of Section 2(a)
prohibiting trademarks that “may disparage . . . persons, living or
dead.”87 This leaves unanswered whether refusal of other types of
trademarks prohibited by Section 2(a) should be treated likewise
because Section 2(a) does not limit the prohibition to only disparaging
trademarks. Rather, Section 2(a) in its entirety also prohibits registration
of trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral . . . or scandalous
matter.”88
Notably, Justice Kennedy explained that the majority did not address
First Amendment implications of the other provisions of the Lanham
Act.89 Disparaging trademarks are one of a handful of grounds for
registration refusal found in 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Others include marks
featuring the flag of any country or state, marks using an individual’s
name without their consent, and descriptive or deceptively
misdescriptive marks.90
Around the time that Simon Tam brought the issue of
constitutionality of the prohibition of disparaging trademarks to the
Federal Circuit, Erik Brunetti raised a similar constitutional argument
against Section 2(a)’s “immoral and scandalous” clause. While the
resulting court decisions were pending, the USPTO placed a hold on the
examination of registration applications for trademarks implicating
Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause or immoral and scandalous clause.91
Following the decision in Matal v. Tam, the USPTO issued guidance
stating that it was lifting the suspensions on applications for trademarks
implicating Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause or immoral and

87. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
88. Section 2(a) provides several other provisions primarily prohibiting deceptive trademarks. 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a). Because the primary purpose of trademarks is to distinguish between the sources of
goods, prohibitions against deceptive marks certainly qualifies as a substantial government interest to
justify registration refusal. For this reason, those provisions will not be discussed here.
89. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1768.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
91. John L. Welch, USPTO Exam Guide 2-18: Scandalousness Refusals on Hold Pending Final
Resolution of In re Brunetti, The TTABlog (May 31, 2018), https://goo.gl/PGDpsS (last visited Oct. 22,
2018).
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scandalous clause.92 However, the Court in Tam provided no guidance
on whether Section 2(a)’s immoral and scandalous clause suffered from
the same First Amendment defect as its disparagement clause.
In December 2017, the Federal Circuit answered this question in the
affirmative in In re Brunetti.93 Erik Brunetti applied to register the
trademark FUCT for his clothing brand, but the examining attorney
rejected Brunetti’s application, finding that when FUCT is spoken aloud
it sounds similar to the word “fucked” and Section 2(a) prohibits
registration of trademarks comprising immoral or scandalous matter.94
Brunetti appealed to the TTAB, but the appellate board affirmed the
decision after consulting references such as Urban Dictionary95 and
Google Images, which associated the term “fuct” with vulgar material.96
Specifically, the TTAB found that Brunetti’s use of the term would
create inferences of “strong and often explicit, sexual imagery that
objectifies women and offers degrading examples of nihilism.”97
The Federal Circuit recognized that the TTAB correctly held that the
mark was immoral or scandalous, but held that the TTAB wrongfully
ruled that the mark was ineligible for registration because Section 2(a)’s
“bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional
restriction of free speech.”98 The government’s position was that refusal
of Brunetti’s trademark was warranted, primarily contending that the
Supreme Court’s holding in Tam only applies when Section 2(a)
implicates viewpoint discrimination, and therefore, is not applicable to
the prohibition of immoral or scandalous trademarks, which is viewpoint
neutral.99
The Federal Circuit refused to address whether the immoral or
scandalous provision of Section 2(a) is viewpoint neutral, but ruled that
regardless, it is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech
for which the government has no adequate interest.100 The Supreme
Court in Tam did not directly address the immoral and scandalous
provision, but the Brunetti Court still argued that the Tam decision
92. Trademark Examination Guides, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
https://goo.gl/Nq65cp (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
93. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d. 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
94. Id. at 1337.
95. Urban Dictionary, https://www.urbandictionary.com/, (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
96. In re Brunetti, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 328 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd., 2014).
97. Id. at *11.
98. Id. However, if the government’s intent is that a mark such as FUCT be unregistrable, an
avenue may exist. Congress could amend Section 2(a) to prohibit federal trademark registration for
obscene marks since the First Amendment traditionally has been interpreted to not protect obscenity.
Federal Circuit Court Justice Dyk highlighted this path being available to the government in his
concurring opinion in Brunetti. 877 at 1358 (J. Dyk, concurring).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1351-52.
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supports a finding that protecting the public from offensive marks is an
inadequate interest to justify speech restriction.101 Writing for the
majority in Tam, Justice Alito asserted that restriction for being
offensive “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle.”102 Similarly,
in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he reported the Court’s long
history of precluding the government from identifying the offensive
nature of speech as a justification for restriction.103 Additionally, the
Brunetti Court pointed to the long-standing uncertainty with how the
USPTO has applied the immoral or scandalous provision, noting that it
allowed registration for some immoral or scandalous marks, such as
MUTHA EFFIN BINGO,104 FUGLY,105 and FAT MILF,106 but refused
registration for others, including NO $#!+, NO BS ZONE, and MILF
MANIA.107
Because the Federal Circuit employed such a similar analysis in
Brunetti as the Supreme Court did in Tam, it’s likely that the Federal
Circuit Brunetti decision will remain the highest authority on the issue
of First Amendment analysis regarding Section 2(a)’s immoral or
scandalous provision. The Supreme Court in Tam indeed failed to take
advantage of the opportunity to provide the most authoritative and clear
answer on this topic, but that should have little impact. The Federal
Circuit’s Brunetti analysis and holding is clearly consistent with the
Supreme Court’s ruling and it would be unlikely for the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari only to end up affirming the decision outright.
2. Is this really a Free Speech issue?
A significant question remains apparent: is Section 2(a) even a First
Amendment issue? Of course, the restriction set forth in Section 2(a)
must have some level of First Amendment implication or it would not
have played such a major role in many levels of the Tam proceedings.
However, the extent to which Section 2(a) truly constitutes an
abridgement of an applicant’s First Amendment right to free speech and
expression is not as concrete as the Supreme Court laid it out to be.
As the TTAB emphasized in earlier proceedings, the refusal of the
PTO to register an applicant’s trademark does not involve the

101. Id.
102. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). Justice Alito later cited twelve Supreme Court
cases striking down the government’s restrictions aimed at offensive speech. Id. at 1763.
103. Id. at 1767.
104. MUTHA EFFIN BINGO, Reg. No. 4,183,272.
105. FUGLY, Reg. No. 5,135,615.
106. FAT MILF, Reg. No. 3,372,094.
107. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d. 1330, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 9

884

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

government restricting the applicant from using that particular mark, but
rather it’s the government refusing to grant the applicant a monopoly on
using the mark in commerce and the availability of federal government
resources to assist in enforcing a trademark holder’s right to their
federally registered trademarks. Federal trademark registration may
provide additional favorable protections to a trademark from that
afforded at common law.108 However, federal trademark registration is
not a prerequisite to the ability to use a mark, nor is it a prerequisite for
a mark to be afforded protections.109 Likewise, refusal of registration by
the PTO is not equivalent to the PTO proscribing an applicant from
using the mark moving forward.
In effect, Simon Tam still had the ability to use the name THE
SLANTS despite the initial rejection of his federal trademark
registration application. Tam’s mark simply wouldn’t be afforded the
same protections that a federally registered mark would receive. This
doesn’t necessarily mean that Tam’s mark would receive no protections
as it may very well have warranted protections available via the
common law. Essentially, by denying federal trademark registration, the
government is not restricting Tam’s speech because it wouldn’t have
precluded him from using the mark, and therefore wouldn’t have
restricted his speech outright.
However, a more nuanced approach to analyzing the role that the
First Amendment plays in assessing the constitutionality of Section 2(a)
reveals that barring federal trademark registration for disparaging,
immoral, or scandalous terms undoubtedly approaches free speech and
expression. While they may not directly proscribe an individual using a
particular term as their mark, Section 2(a)’s prohibitions create a
chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression. Essentially, not
affording federal registration effectively forces self-censorship by
applicants. For example, if an applicant has an expressive trademark that
approaches the concept of disparaging, or immoral, or scandalous, he or
she may choose to revise their mark in favor of a safer mark. In this
situation, the government has, in effect, suppressed that applicants First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression. However, this
restriction would be completely indirect because the applicant would
still have the ability to use the mark, just not the ability to register the
mark with the federal government.
Remarkably, an argument can be made that federal trademark
registration imparts a much more concrete First Amendment restriction
on individuals not applying for trademarks than on the applicants

108. See supra section II(a).
109. Id.
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themselves. By granting the registration of a trademark, the government
effectively prohibits the speech of individuals other than the trademark
holder. Granting an applicant’s federal trademark registration
application undeniably results in a restriction placed on others from
using the applicant’s mark, or else they face liability to the trademark
holder for trademark infringement. This restriction effectuates the social
justice theory offered by Tam and Tam’s supporters of “taking back”
disparaging terms such as THE SLANTS in order to weaken their
derogatory force. In theory, having virtuous individuals granted the
exclusive right to use a derogatory term or slur in commerce as a
trademark would then prohibit hateful individuals from potentially
profiting off such a term when using them in malicious manners.
B. Wandering Dago:110 an example of rightfully applying the Tam First
Amendment analysis to a non-trademark government registration
program.
Questions have risen as to whether the holding in Tam applies to
government registration or licensure programs outside of the area of
trademark law. The decision in Tam obviously creates repercussions in
trademark law: registration applications for disparaging terms are likely
to increase significantly.111 Following Brunetti, where the Federal
Circuit applied analysis consistent with Tam, registration applications
for immoral or scandalous terms are likely to increase as well. However,
Tam’s implications may result in a much broader change than solely that
seen in trademark law. As evidenced by early applications of the Tam
decision, courts have applied a similar First Amendment approach in
other areas of the law involving a denial of government registration
based on ethnic-slur branding.112
This line of inquiry arose during the earlier Tam proceedings
themselves as the TTAB addressed the issue of whether First
Amendment analysis applied to Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause.
The TTAB justified the initial rejection of Tam’s application by
emphasizing that the refusal of registration only applied to Tam’s right
to register the term THE SLANTS but does not affect his right to use the
term.113. Following this argument, Tam’s First Amendment right to free
speech and expression was not suppressed because his speech was not
actually restricted. On the same note, the government argued that
110. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 28 (2nd Cir. 2018).
111. As previously mentioned, in the period following the Supreme Court’s decision in Matal v.
Tam, applications to register trademarks for disparaging terms noticeably increased.
112. Wandering Dago, 879 F.3d at 28.
113. In re Simon Shiao Tam, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 485 *1 (TTAB 2013).
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trademark registration is a government subsidy, and so First Amendment
analysis would not apply.114 However, the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that federal trademark registration is a government subsidy
program and applied First Amendment analysis separate from a body of
case law involving government subsidies accordingly. 115
In addressing the government’s litany of contentions that trademark
registration was a government subsidy, or that trademark registration
should be analyzed under a novel “government-program doctrine,” the
Court acknowledged that “[t]rademark registration is not the only
government registration scheme.”116 In fact, many forms of government
registration exist, including copyrights and patents at the federal level,
and driver’s licenses or hunting permits at the state level. Despite this
acknowledgement, the Court did not state, or even suggest, that the Tam
analysis and holding applied to all government registration programs,
and not just trademark registration. Even further, cases involving these
government subsidy programs on which the government relied were
deemed to be entirely unhelpful in terms of assessing the
constitutionality of speech restrictions imposed with the government
program.117 Nonetheless, recent cases suggest that the Tam holding has
already impacted non-trademark government registration programs.
In 2013, two food truck owners, Andrea Loguidice and Brandon
Snooks, operating their food truck under the brand Wandering Dago
(“WD”), sought a permit from the New York State Office of General
Services (“OGS”), which requires vendors selling food on the Empire
State Plaza in Albany, NY to obtain a permit.118 OGS rejected WD’s
permit application on the grounds that their name was an offensive
ethnic slur for individuals of Italian descent, and that the names of the
sandwiches they served involved other ethnic slurs.119 Like Simon Tam,
the WD operators saw their use of the slurs as “giving a ‘nod to [their]
Italian heritage’ and to their ancestors.”120 By using these slurs, they
believed that they were conveying to other immigrants a welcoming
message and that they were weakening the derogatory impact that the
slurs may have.121 Accordingly, WD brought suit alleging that OGS
violated its First Amendment rights to free speech by rejecting the

114. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1761 (2017).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 28 (2nd Cir. 2018).
119. Id. Other slurs used included "Dago," "Castro," "American Idiot," "Goombah," "Guido,"
"Polack," "El Guapo," and "KaSchloppas."
120. Id. at 25.
121. Id.
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application on the basis of using ethnic slurs for branding purposes.122
Citing Tam in their analysis, the Second Circuit held that the rejection
of WD’s use of ethnic slurs as branding in this case amounted to a
viewpoint and the rejection of WD’s permit application on the basis of
using those ethnic slurs amounted to viewpoint-based restriction—thus,
the denial was an unconstitutional abridgement of WD’s First
Amendment rights to free speech.123 However, the First Amendment
issues are much more applicable in the case of Wandering Dago. Denial
of WD’s right to use their branding in the plaza, on the basis of the
words used in their branding, is an outright restriction of WD’s ability to
use the terms, and therefore a direct restriction of free speech and
expression.
Conversely, in Tam, even after the USPTO denied Simon Tam federal
trademark registration for the band name THE SLANTS, he still could
have used that mark as a band name wherever he saw fit, just without
the mark being registered federally. The vital point of distinction is that
Simon Tam would not have been prohibited from using his speech,
whereas Wandering Dago would have been prohibited from selling their
food from their food truck at the plaza without the requisite permit.
Ultimately, this point of distinction conveys an explanation as to why
the Tam First Amendment analysis is more appropriate in Wandering
Dago and other government registration cases where speech is actually
restricted, than it is in the case of Tam itself.
C. No matter the level of First Amendment involvement, Section 2(a)
does not survive even rational basis review.
After several contentions from the government and subsequent
lengthy discussions regarding what type of speech restriction Section
2(a) involves, the Court ultimately determined that Section 2(a)’s
disparagement clause constituted unconstitutional viewpoint-based
restriction on private speech.124 The government contended that federal
trademark registration was a form of government speech, because the
First Amendment does not regulate government speech, and so the
government would not be required to remain viewpoint-neutral in its
own speech.125 However, Justice Alito noted that “affixing a government
seal of approval” does not alone constitute speech made by the
government, and so the USPTO registering a trademark created by a
122. Id. at 29.
123. Id.
124. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2017).
125. Id. at 1757; (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“[t]he Free
Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government speech”).
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private actor could not constitute speech made by the government.126
Outside of government speech, regardless of the category of First
Amendment restriction that Section 2(a) falls into, the government
would have to provide a sufficient justification in order for the
restriction to be upheld as constitutional.127 The only legitimate
justification that could be provided by the government for the
prohibition against federal trademark registration for disparaging,
immoral, or scandalous terms is to protect the public from being
subjected to offensive terms and ideas. However, there is a longstanding history of the Supreme Court rejecting protection against
offensive ideas as a justification for First Amendment restrictions.
Justice Alito cites twelve cases alone in support of this continuous
rejection.128 No matter how direct or indirect, or concrete or nebulous,
the implication of the First Amendment under Section 2(a), the
government could not have provided a substantial justification to allow
Section 2(a) to remain constitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
Several ambiguities remain following the Supreme Court’s decision
in Matal v. Tam. However, some of the answers may be becoming
apparent through early applications of the Tam holding. Adherence to
Tam by the Federal Circuit in In re Brunetti strongly suggests that the
prohibition against federal trademark registration of immoral or
scandalous terms as set forth by Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act should
undoubtedly be afforded the same analysis as Section 2(a)’s provision
proscribing federal trademark registration of disparaging terms.
Accordingly, the immoral or scandalous provision suffers from the exact
same First Amendment fate as the disparagement clause—an
unconstitutional restriction placed on the applicant’s right to free speech
and expression.
Even more broadly, however, Matal v. Tam suggests that the
government may violate an individual’s First Amendment right to free
speech and expression even when it does not place a restriction on the
126. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758.
127. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
128. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988);
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509-14 (1969); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940);
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
365 (1937).
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speech or expression outright. Federal trademark registration does not
grant a trademark holder the right to use a term in commerce, nor does
refusal of federal trademark registration preclude that individual from
using the term. Because of this, no speech or expression is directly
suppressed by Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibited the
federal registration of disparaging terms as trademarks.
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